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COMMENT 
Hollywood’s Red Dawn: China’s 
Restrictions on American Film 
Taylor Shortal* 
ABSTRACT 
The Chinese film market has undergone unprecedented expansion in the 
past 17 years. As North American box office revenues drop, Hollywood 
film studios often rely on the Chinese market to balance the costs of block-
buster films. However, Beijing maintains strict regulations on China’s film 
imports, including annual quotas on the number of foreign films released, 
limits on the share of grosses Hollywood studios can receive from 
their films, and content censorship based on Communist Party 
directives. Many of these regulations are designed to incentivize 
Hollywood studios to co-produce films with Chinese companies. 
Through co-production agreements, Beijing anticipates that Chinese 
filmmakers will eventually gain enough experience to replace their 
American collaborators. Faced with these restrictions, Hollywood 
studios and U.S. officials have several options to negotiate for fewer 
trade barriers, or to retaliate with restrictions of their own. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, MGM Studios decided to overhaul one of its productions.1 Although 
filming and editing were complete, no studio had agreed to distribute the film, and 
it sat on the shelf without a planned release date.2 The film — Red Dawn — was a 
remake of John Milius’s 1984 cult classic.3 
Made at the height of the Cold War, the original story followed several Amer-
ican teenagers, led by Patrick Swayze and Charlie Sheen, who retreat into the Col-
orado mountains to launch a guerilla war against invading Soviet forces.4 For the 
remake, the teenagers, now led by Chris Hemsworth, were no longer fighting Rus-
sian antagonists, but the Chinese military.5 The change drew scorn from Chinese 
media outlets. The Global Times,6 a newspaper distributed by the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s flagship publisher,7 derided the unreleased film for “demonizing” 
the Chinese government.8 
At the time, China was the fastest-growing film market in the world,9 and the 
decision-making hub of the Communist state in  Beijing only allowed a limited 
number of foreign films to be released in the nation.10 Hollywood distributors, fear-
ing a loss of market access, refused to back the theatrical release of Red Dawn, even 
in the U.S.11 To appease distributers, MGM devoted $1 million to re-edits, re-
shoots, and digital alterations.12 All references to the Chinese government were sys-
tematically erased.13 Through movie magic, the antagonists were no longer Chinese, 
but North Korean.14 The film was eventually released in the U.S., but China never 
selected it for distribution.15 Although Red Dawn intended to show China’s military 
power, it now stands as an example of the country’s far-reaching economic power. 
                                                          
 1. Dan Bigman, Why Do North Koreans Invade the U.S. In ‘Red Dawn’ Remake? For The Money, 
Of Course, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2012, 3:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dan-
bigman/2012/11/21/why-do-north-koreans-invade-the-u-s-in-red-dawn-remake-for-the-
money/#278b42099dea. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Snejana Farberov, Producers behind Red Dawn remake swapped Chinese flags and insignia for 
North Korean ones for fear of losing out on billion-dollar box office, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 23, 
2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2237717/Red-Dawn-remake-swapped-Chinese-flags-
insignia-North-Korean-ones-fear-losing-billion-dollar-box-office.html. 
 7. Zheping Huang, Inside the Global Times, China’s hawkish, belligerent state tabloid, QUARTZ 
(Aug. 9, 2016), https://qz.com/745577/inside-the-global-times-chinas-hawkish-belligerent-state-tab-
loid/. 
 8. Farberov, supra note 6. 
 9. Bigman, supra note 1. 
 10. Chris Schrader, ‘Red Dawn’ Villains Switched from China to North Korea, SCREEN RANT (Mar. 
16, 2011), https://screenrant.com/red-dawn-villains-china-north-korea/. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Farberov, supra note 6. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Sean O’Connor & Nicholas Armstrong, Directed by Hollywood, Edited by China: How China’s 
Censorship and Influence Affect Films Worldwide, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SECURITY REV. COMMISSION 
12 (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Directed%20by%20Holly-
wood%20Edited%20by%20China.pdf. 
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China was ranked fifth internationally in box office grosses when MGM de-
cided to refashion Red Dawn.16 For several years, industry analysts have expected 
China to surpass the U.S. and become the largest film market in the world.17 Films 
produced in China are currently outperforming American imports at the Chinese 
box office.18 This success is partially the result of protectionist quotas and release 
controls blocking U.S. films from competing during the busiest movie-going sea-
sons.19 However, Hollywood studios are still able to find success in China during 
the decline of the U.S. market. Movies such as XXX: The Return of Xander Cage 
and Warcraft, although financial disappointments in the U.S., became box office 
hits because of their popularity in China.20 
This has led to increasing pressure on Hollywood to export films to China.21 
Complying with Beijing’s censorship standards has become vital for studios, affect-
ing everything from the inclusion of certain actors,22 and pro-Chinese government 
messages,23 to the exclusion of religious themes,24 and same-sex relationships.25 To 
evade quotas and other restrictions, Hollywood studios have pursued more co-pro-
ductions with Chinese studios, which often carry conditions on casting, filming lo-
cations, and transfers of filmmaking technology.26 
Beijing’s system for incentivizing co-productions is intended to facilitate 
greater Chinese familiarity with Hollywood techniques in the hopes that domestic 
filmmakers will eventually surpass Hollywood’s dominance in visual effects-driven 
films.27 In pursuit of short term gains, Hollywood studios have been largely com-
plicit in a process designed to one day replace them.28 
The growing reliance on China to recoup inflating film budgets has left Holly-
wood at a strategic disadvantage in negotiating for reduced Chinese regulations. But 
Hollywood is not without possible solutions. Several courses of action are available, 
including boycotting the Chinese market, retaliatory trade restrictions, and moving 
to exclude Chinese films from foreign markets. Each possible solution carries po-
                                                          
 16. Schrader, supra note 10. 
 17. Hollie McKay, Could China’s growing influence in Hollywood affect Christian-themed movies?, 
FOX NEWS (June 18, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2013/06/18/could-chinas-growing-
influence-in-hollywood-affect-christian-themed-movies.html. 
 18. Cheang Ming, China is acting blatantly protectionist in an industry that’s hugely important to the 
US, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2017, 9:51 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/03/hollywood-blackout-china-is-
giving-domestically-made-films-a-boost.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Ashley Rodriguez, Who the hell watched “Warcraft”? China is fueling the market for overdone 
Hollywood action movies, QUARTZ (Mar. 28, 2017), https://qz.com/943799/who-the-hell-watched-
warcraft-china-is-fueling-the-market-for-overdone-hollywood-action-movies/. 
 21. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 7. 
 22. Hannah Beech, How China is Remaking the Global Film Industry, TIME (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://time.com/4649913/china-remaking-global-film-industry/. 
 23. Joanna Robinson, Did You Catch All the Ways Hollywood Pandered to China This Year?, VANITY 
FAIR (Aug. 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/08/did-you-catch-the-
ways-hollywood-pandered-to-china-this-year. 
 24. McKay, supra note 17. 
 25. Robinson, supra note 23. 
 26. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 8–9. 
 27. Nancy Tartaglione, Hollywood & China: Does Donald Trump’s Trade Probe Impact The Film 
Industry?, DEADLINE (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:24 PM), http://deadline.com/2017/08/donald-turmp-trade-inves-
tigation-hollywood-impact-1202149101/. 
 28. Id. 
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tential risks and rewards. This article recommends implementing an inclusive solu-
tion to increase co-productions with Chinese filmmakers, while limiting Chinese 
investments in American media. 
II.  THE EXPANSION OF THE CHINESE FILM ECONOMY 
China’s rise has been swift. In 2017, total box office grosses in the country 
passed $7.55 billion for the first time — over fifty times China’s annual box office 
revenue in 2000.29 In 2015, there were only 5,600 movie theaters for the nation’s 
1.3 billion people.30 By 2017, the number of theaters reached parity with the U.S. 
at approximately 40,000.31 At one point, an average of 15 new movie screens were 
built a day.32 By contrast, American theater attendance is declining, with ticket sales 
in the summer of 2017 falling to their lowest point in 25 years.33 
The expansion of the Chinese film market has been fueled by several factors. 
The country’s middle class has grown rapidly, with the per capita gross domestic 
product rising from under $1,000 in 2000 to over $7,500 in 2014.34 Chinese mov-
iegoers are also younger. Unlike in the U.S., where the average audience member 
is over 30, the typical ticket buyer in China is just 22.35 With high levels of dispos-
able income,36 younger Chinese audiences, who view film exhibitions as social 
events,37 are spiking ticket sales. 
The rise in Chinese box office sales has also been caused by the rise in Ameri-
can film imports. In the late 1940s, Hollywood led the Chinese market.38 Just after 
World War II, 67% of movies released in Shanghai were imported from the U.S.39 
After the Communist Revolution, however, China closed itself to foreign films.40 
State media ridiculed American films as being “imperial poison” sedating the Chi-
nese public with “sex and legs.”41 For years, theatrical offerings were limited to 
Communist propaganda films.42 By the 1990s, film attendance in China dwindled, 
falling 79% from 1982 to 1991.43 Wanting to boost box office sales, Beijing re-
turned to importing films.44 In 1994, the American thriller, The Fugitive, starring 
                                                          
 29. Patrick Frater, China’s Box Office Passes $7.5 Billion Landmark, VARIETY (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:53 
PM), http://variety.com/2017/film/asia/china-box-office-landmark-1202620166/. 
 30. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 6. 
 31. Daniel Allen, Lights, Camera, Approval – China’s New Film Law, EASTWESTBANK (Jan. 9, 
2017), https://www.eastwestbank.com/ReachFurther/News/Article/Lights-Camera-Approval-Chinas-
New-Film-Law. 
 32. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 6. 
 33. Anthony D’Alessandro, How Will Studios End the Lowest Summer In 25 Years? By Not Opening 
Any Wide Releases Over Labor Day, DEADLINE (Aug. 14, 2017, 4:44 PM), http://dead-
line.com/2017/08/labor-day-weekend-box-office-no-major-studio-releases-25-years-years-worst-sum-
mer-box-office-1202148544/. 
 34. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 5. 
 35. Allen, supra note 31. 
 36. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 5–6. 
 37. Allen, supra note 31. 
 38. KERRY SEAGRAVE, AMERICAN FILMS BROAD: HOLLYWOOD’S DOMINATION OF THE WORLD’S 
MOVIE SCREENS 158 (McFarland & Company, Inc. ed., 1st ed. 1997). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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Harrison Ford, opened to large Chinese fanfare.45 The “historic” release proved fi-
nancially successful both for the American studio and Chinese theaters, grossing 
just under $3 million in China.46 
Twenty years later, American releases grossed over $2 billion in China,47 ac-
counting for  25% of the country’s box office revenue from 2008 to 2014.48 As 
theatrical attendance in North America falls, and budgets for American blockbusters 
increase, Hollywood studios are becoming dependent on the international market to 
recover costs.49 In 2014, over 70% of the revenue made by the six largest Holly-
wood film studios came from foreign markets.50 Billion-dollar blockbusters, like 
Vin Diesel’s car chase spy film, The Fate of the Furious, grossed $393 million in 
China, while also generating $226 million in North America.51 Other high-budget 
films, including Guillermo del Toro’s giant monster movie, Pacific Rim,52 and Dun-
can Jones’s video game adaptation, Warcraft, have relied on Chinese audiences to 
recover from financial loses in North America.53 Domestic disappointments like 
XXX: The Return of Xander Cage,54 and Resident Evil: The Final Chapter,55 failed 
to crack $50 million in North America. In China, however, both films grossed more 
than the Chinese theatrical run of Star Wars: The Force Awakens.56 
In some instances, American imports have faced intense competition from Chi-
nese domestically produced films.57 In 2017, with a  $31 million budget,58 Wolf 
Warriors 2, a film about a Chinese special ops veteran battling American merce-
naries, grossed $810 million in China.59 The film featured an international crew 
with Joe and Anthony Russo, directors of Captain America: Winter Solider and 
Captain America: Civil War, working as consultants.60 Other Chinese films have 
also generated success by attracting Hollywood filmmakers. Reny Harlin, director 
of Die Hard 2: Die Harder and Deep Blue Sea, spearheaded the Chinese production 
of Skiptrace, a buddy action comedy starring Jackie Chan and Johnny Knoxville.61 
Made on a $30 million budget, the film earned $130 million in China.62 
                                                          
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. Id. at 6. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Paul Schrodt, Hollywood’s big bet on China is backfiring, OUTLINE (Sept. 6, 2017, 1:33 PM), 
https://theoutline.com/post/2212/hollywood-s-big-bet-on-china-is-backfiring. 
 52. Nikki Finke, ‘Pacific Rim’ $9M Opening In China Biggest Ever For Warner Bros: Sequel Likely 
Now, DEADLINE (July 31, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://deadline.com/2013/07/pacific-rim-9m-opening-in-
china-biggest-ever-for-warner-bros-sequel-likely-553878/. 
 53. Schrodt, supra note 51. 
 54. XXX: The Return of Xander Cage, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/mov-
ies/?id=xxx3.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
 55. Resident Evil: The Final Chapter, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/mov-
ies/?id=residentevil6.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2017). 
 56. Rodriguez, supra note 20. 
 57. Patrick Frater, ‘Wolf Warrior II’s’ Massive Success Forces Studios to Rethink China Approach, 
VARIETY (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/china-wolf-warrior-ii-
1202543266/. 
 58. Wolf Warrior 2, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=wolfwarrior2.htm 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2017). 
 59. Frater, supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Beech, supra note 22. 
 62. Id. 
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Despite filmmaking advances, Chinese productions still trail behind Holly-
wood technologically.63 Beijing hopes to grow China’s film industry by incentiviz-
ing partnerships between Chinese filmmakers and Hollywood studios.64 The gov-
ernment’s aspirations are primarily geopolitical. China’s 13th Five Year Plan for 
the nation’s future emphasized developing its domestic film industry to broadcast 
nationalist and socialist values.65 But Beijing’s ambitions are not limited to its own 
borders. Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged China to create a “global creative 
industry.”66 Beijing’s “Belt and Road Initiative” avows to position China as the 
center of global culture by interconnecting dozens of economies across Asia, Eu-
rope, and Africa.67 Chinese officials signed cultural exchange agreements with fif-
teen members of the Belt and Road Initiative to hold annual film festivals and create 
a common “cultural link.”68 Additionally, Beijing is developing a film treaty with 
Japan, the world’s third-largest film market, to strengthen cultural ties between the 
two nations.69 
Beijing’s international proposals are ambitious, but the current export market 
for Chinese films is small.70 The majority of movie screens in other countries are 
still dominated by American films,71 and mainstream distributors in Western coun-
tries have declined to purchase Chinese exports.72 Moreover, Chinese productions 
often fall into genres unpopular with international critics.73 Chinese comedies, ro-
mances, and patriotic political dramas — though hits at home — have struggled to 
win selection in European film festivals.74 In North America, audience distaste for 
dubbing and subtitles has fueled a trade imbalance in theatrical releases, with for-
eign films comprising less than 1% of U.S. box office revenue.75 China’s biggest 
blockbuster of all time, Wolf Warrior 2, earned only $2 million in North America.76 
Even The Flowers of War, a $100 million prestige epic starring Christian Bale about 
the Nanking Massacre, grossed only $311,000 in the U.S.77 
                                                          
 63. Allen, supra note 31. 
 64. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 6. 
 65. David Gitter & Eisa Kania, US-China Frictions in Film: Hollywood With Chinese Characteristics, 
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 29, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/us-china-frictions-in-film-hollywood-
with-chinese-characteristics/. 
 66. Beech, supra note 22. 
 67. Vivienne Chow, China’s Silk Road Initiative Could Have Far-Reaching Consequences for Enter-
tainment Industry, VARIETY (Sept. 13, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/silk-road-in-
frastructure-initiative-1202555743/. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Patrick Brzeski, Tokyo Film Festival: Japan, China Working Toward Landmark Co-Production 
Treaty, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 25, 2017, 11:42 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/tokyo-
film-festival-japan-china-working-landmark-production-treaty-1051991. 
 70. Stephen Galloway, How Hollywood Conquered the World (All Over Again), FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 
24, 2012, 12:17 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/24/how-hollywood-conquered-the-world-all-
over-again/. 
 71. Id. 




 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Galloway, supra note 70. 
 76. Wolf Warrior 2, supra note 58. 
 77. Beech, supra note 22. 
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Private and state-owned Chinese companies have been more successful at en-
tering international film finance and film exhibition.78 Since 2012, real estate and 
entertainment giant, Dalian Wanda — founded by China’s richest man, Wang 
Jianlin — has acquired both AMC Theaters,79 and Europe’s largest theater chain, 
Odeon & UCI.80 In 2016, Wanda moved further into the international film market 
with the $3.5 billion purchase of Legendary Entertainment, the studio behind Ju-
rassic World,81 the 2014 American remake of Godzilla,82 and Christopher Nolan’s 
Dark Knight trilogy.83 A former executive for the Weinstein Company, which 
worked with Wanda to finance the Jake Gyllenhaal boxing drama, Southpaw, said 
Wanda representatives “were on set and involved in production, postproduction, 
marketing, everything,” because “they wanted to learn how we do what we do.”84 
Wanda officials said its investments in the U.S. were intended to support “China’s 
entry into Hollywood’s film industry and generally promote Chinese culture 
abroad.”85 
Other Chinese companies are backing American productions as well, with hun-
dreds of millions infused into films ranging from Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, 
Star Trek: Beyond, and the Leonardo DiCaprio wilderness survival thriller, The 
Revenant.86 While international buyers ignore Chinese films, American studios are 
eager to receive Chinese producers as new financial partners. 
III.  RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN FILM IMPORTS                                 
As budgets for Hollywood films rise, pressure mounts on American studios to 
release films into China.87 However, Hollywood films face numerous barriers to 
succeed in China, including content censorship from Communist Party members,88 
and quotas restricting the number of foreign films that can be imported.89 Addition-
ally, Hollywood studios have no control over their film’s release schedules,90 and 
face mandated ceilings on the percentage of box office profits they can receive.91 
The only option available for Hollywood studios hoping to evade import quotas and 
increase their share of box office revenue is to “co-produce” a film with a Chinese 
                                                          
 78. Chinese Films Off the Radar at Cannes, but Korean Movies Flourish, supra note 72. 
 79. Edward Wong, Chinese Purchases of U.S. Companies Have Some in Congress Raising Eyebrows, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/world/asia/china-us-foreign-acqui-
sition-dalian-wanda.html. 
 80. Beech, supra note 22. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Brooks Barnes, Dalian Wanda of China Offers a Carrot to Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/business/media/dalian-wanda-goes-on-an-entertainment-
shopping-spree.html. 
 83. Frederik Balfour & Ronald Grover, China and Hollywood Team Up for More Co-Productions, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 8, 2011, 5:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2011-09-08/china-and-hollywood-team-up-for-more-co-productions. 
 84. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 6. 
 85. Balfour & Grover, supra note 83. 
 86. Chinese Films Off the Radar at Cannes, but Korean Movies Flourish, supra note 72. 
 87. Schrodt, supra note 51. 
 88. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 9. 
 89. Gitter & Kania, supra note 65. 
 90. Ming, supra note 18. 
 91. Gitter & Kania, supra note 65. 
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studio.92 Co-productions, however, carry additional regulations and remain subject 
to censorship by state agencies who can still refuse to distribute the film.93 
A.  Censorship 
All films, television programs, and other entertainment goods distributed in 
China must be approved by the State Administration of Press Publication Radio 
Film and Television (“SAPPRFT”).94 Films with elements opposed by SAPPRFT 
censors must be re-edited or suffer prohibition from the Chinese market.95 The au-
thority of SAPPRFT is far sweeping, with statutory mandates ensuring Chinese 
Communist Party objectives are enforced.96 SAPPRFT is exclusively staffed by 
Communist Party members,97 and the agency’s own directives forbid films from 
violating the Chinese Constitution or social morality.98 Content deemed unaccepta-
ble by SAPPRFT has included crime, violence,99 nudity, homosexuality,100 reli-
gious themes,101 ghosts, and time travel.102 Films are also generally barred from 
depicting China in any negative light.103 
SAPPRFT censorship has resulted in numerous edits to American films. 
SAPPRFT resistance to violent imagery in Django Unchained lead director Quentin 
Tarantino to make significant cuts to the film.104 Disgruntled by the edits, Tarantino 
urged Chinese fans to pirate an uncensored version of the film instead of watching 
the theatrical cut.105 Likewise, the 3D re-release of Titanic underwent edits to con-
ceal Kate Winslet during her famous nude scene.106 Chinese Government officials 
said, “[c]onsidering the vivid 3D effects, we fear viewers may reach out their hands 
for a touch and thus interrupt other people’s viewing.”107 
While concerns over sexuality and violence are well-known in Hollywood, 
American studios often have difficulty anticipating what will be censored.108 De-
spite Chinese and American studios working together to co-produce the 2010 re-
make of Karate Kid, starring Jackie Chan, the film was not authorized for release 
initially because the story’s villain was a Chinese national.109 With Pirates of the 
                                                          
 92. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 8. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Hollywood and China’s Unequal Affair, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/hollywood-and-chinas-unequal-affair. 
 96. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 9. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Rudie Obias, 10 Movies That Were Banned in China, MENTAL FLOSS (July 14, 2016), http://men-
talfloss.com/article/83136/10-movies-were-banned-china. 
 100. Patrick Frater, China’s Art House Alliance Strives to Increase Film Diversity, VARIETY (Sept. 13, 
2017, 8:15 AM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/china-art-house-alliance-sapprft-1202555749/. 
 101. McKay, supra note 17. 
 102. Obias, supra note 99. 
 103. Gitter & Kania, supra note 65. 
 104. Hollywood and China’s Unequal Affair, supra note 95. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Aaron Couch, Cut, Censored, Changed: 10 Hollywood Films Tweaked for International Release, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:52 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/gallery/cut-censored-
changed-10-hollywood-414099/1-lincoln. 
 107. Id. 
 108. O’Connor & Armstrong, supra note 15, at 11. 
 109. Id. 
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Caribbean: At World’s End, Chinese audiences had difficulty following the plot 
after several scenes featuring rival pirate captain, Chow-Yun Fat, were deleted.110 
The inclusion of Fat’s character constituted “vilifying and defacing the Chinese,” 
according to SAPPRFT.111 Further, state censorship extends to how non-villainous 
Chinese characters are treated by other fictional characters. For the James Bond 
film, Skyfall, SAPPRFT required the exclusion of a scene showing a Chinese secu-
rity guard being killed by one of 007’s enemies.112 Even portrayals of Chinese 
standards of living can draw SAPPRFT’s ire. Shots of laundry drying on clothes-
lines in Shanghai were altered in Mission: Impossible 3 after censors determined 
the images negatively depicted the city.113 
Further puzzling filmmakers, SAPPRFT’s censorship is unpredictable and ab-
stract. Avatar was originally denied distribution because of its rebellious political 
themes,114 and was only released after protests.115 Men in Black III could only be 
opened in China after omitting a scene where civilians’ memories were erased be-
cause, in an ironic twist, the scene could have been interpreted as social commentary 
on Chinese state censorship.116 
Meanwhile, films that retain dissident content over SAPPRFT’s disapproval, 
including Brokeback Mountain and The Departed, are blocked.117 Some films, be-
cause of their premise alone, could not be re-edited to appease censors. The Biblical 
epic, Noah, starring Russel Crowe, was barred to enforce the nation’s status as a 
“defiantly secular” society.118 Likewise, the remake of Ghostbusters was rejected 
because media in China are not allowed to “promote cults or superstition.”119 True 
stories have also failed to pass SAPPRFT’s restrictions.120 Captain Phillips, the bi-
ographical account of a sea captain rescued from Somalian pirates by U.S. Navy 
SEALs, was denied market access for depicting “the big [m]ilitary machine of the 
U.S. saving one U.S. citizen.”121 By contrast, censors assured, “China would never 
[use military force to save just one citizen] and in no way would want to promote 
this idea.”122  Despite it being decades too late to be reshot or rewritten, Top Gun 
was also barred when re-released in 3D because the fighter pilot film depicted 
American military might.123 Fellow 1980s classic, Back to the Future, suffered a 
similar fate when dropped from television programming,124 because time-travel pre-
sented a “disrespectful portrayal of history.”125 
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Furthermore, films overtly critical of the Chinese government are, of course, 
outlawed.126 Both Seven Years in Tibet and its star, Brad Pitt, were banned from the 
country because the film positively depicted the Dalai Lama.127 Martin Scorsese 
and his film, Kundun, were both prohibited for the same reason.128 Red Corner, 
starring Richard Gere, portrayed an American wrongfully accused of murder in 
China,129 and was also banned for its unfavorable portrayal of the government’s 
legal system.130 Furthermore, Gere, a long-time advocate for Tibetan independence, 
has been blacklisted by Hollywood studios because Chinese officials refuse to im-
port his films.131 Fearing similar reprisals, the filmmakers behind the Marvel film, 
Dr. Strange, purged the screenplay of all references to Tibet,132 and even cast a 
European actress as a character originally intended to be Tibetan.133 
Self-censorship in Hollywood often progresses beyond the script stage.134 In 
Star Trek: Beyond, a shot displaying John Choo’s character, Sulu, kissing another 
man was cut by the studio anticipating state censorship.135 Moreover, emails leaked 
from Sony illustrate how the studio axed a scene in the Adam Sandler comedy, 
Pixels, where the Great Wall was attacked by 1980s arcade game characters. 136 For 
the remake of Red Dawn, the alterations were, of course, far more comprehen-
sive.137 And, in the case of The Dark Knight, Warner Brothers declined to even 
screen the film for state officials, with commentators speculating that scenes where 
Batman captured a Chinese villain in Hong Kong may have been perceived as of-
fensive.138 
China’s censorship has established a powerful chilling effect over Hollywood 
productions.139 This prevents audiences from seeing various forms of artistic ex-
pression and social commentary.140 Presented with the choice, however, Hollywood 
studios elect to suppress the creative intentions of a filmmaker, rather than lose bil-
lions in box office revenue from Chinese cinemagoers.141 
B.  Import Quotas and Release Controls 
Hollywood studios are further pressured to engage in self-censorship because 
only a limited number of foreign films are imported into China.142 Studios rushing 
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to accommodate the sensibilities of Chinese censors may still find their films re-
jected.143 This was the case for the remake of Red Dawn. Although the film under-
went substantial plot alterations, it failed to be selected by state authorities for re-
lease.144 
Foreign films imported into China face two separate quotas: approximately 40 
flat-fee films,145 and 34 revenue-sharing films.146 Flat-fee films are sold from Amer-
ican studios to Chinese exhibitors for a single sum.147 American studios do not re-
ceive box office returns from flat-fee imports and the films are sold at prices signif-
icantly under market value.148 Conversely, for revenue-sharing films, Hollywood 
studios may receive up to 25% of Chinese ticket sale revenue.149 However, this is 
still far below the share studios would receive from U.S. theaters, which typically 
ranges between 55% and 60%.150 
Moreover, American studio profits can be drastically affected by the lack of 
control over the release date of revenue-sharing films. Foreign films are typically 
blocked from Chinese exhibition during peak periods of attendance, like during the 
summer months.151 Additionally, Hollywood films with overlapping audiences are 
sometimes pitted against each other.152 In 2015, Pixels and Minions were released 
just two days apart, cutting box office attendance short for both films.153 The un-
predictability of release scheduling can also deprive studios of a chance to effec-
tively market their films.154 Meanwhile, Beijing can ensure Chinese theaters grant 
preference to domestic films. For the release of The Founding of an Army, a dram-
atization of how the People’s Liberation Army was formed in the 1920s, state offi-
cials required every film exhibitor in China to show the film on at least 45% of their 
screens.155 
Though the quota on revenue-sharing imports rose from 10 films annually in 
the 1990s,156 to 20 in first decade of the 2000s,157 the U.S. government still chal-
lenged Beijing’s import restrictions in a 2007 claim brought to the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).158 The WTO is an international organization designed to 
encourage normalized trade relations between member nations and reduce protec-
tionist economic policies across national borders.159 In 2009, the WTO ruled in fa-
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vor of the U.S., finding quotas on foreign film imports violated the free trade obli-
gations required for WTO membership.160 The Chinese government appealed, but, 
in 2012, the WTO upheld its prior decision, requesting Beijing lift all restrictions 
on imported entertainment.161 Following the WTO’s decision, the U.S. government 
entered bilateral negotiations with the Chinese government and agreed to the cur-
rent quota of 34 revenue-sharing films, with a pledge to renegotiate the deal in 
2017.162 However, no new agreement has been reached,163 and Chinese-produced 
films retain substantial market advantages. 
C.  Co-production Requirements 
The only method to bypass the quotas on film imports, and increase Holly-
wood’s share of box office revenues, is to co-produce the movie with a Chinese 
company.164 Co-productions are treated as domestic films by Chinese authorities, 
and grant foreign investors up to 43% of box office revenue.165 However, co-pro-
duction agreements require numerous creative and financial commitments to gain 
approval from the China Film Co-Production Corporation, which is overseen by 
SAPPRFT.166 To qualify as a co-production, a film must receive 33% of its financ-
ing from Chinese studios, film at least one scene in China,167 and hire a certain 
percentage of Chinese actors.168 In 2013, the President of the China Film Co-Pro-
duction Company spoke to an audience of American filmmakers, stating, “[w]e 
have a huge market and we want to share it with you [but] we want films that are 
heavily invested in Chinese culture, not one or two shots . . . . [w]e want to see 
positive Chinese images.”169 
In some instances, clearing the hurdles to acquire co-production status may 
only have slight effects on a film’s final product. For the co-produced Iron Man 3, 
Marvel Studios cut two different versions of the film,170 with Fan Bingbing, China’s 
most famous actress,171 featured in a scene only shown to Chinese audiences.172 
SAPPRFT’s influence can be farther-reaching on other co-productions, however. 
For the sci-fi film, Looper, to become a co-production, a key sequence where the 
protagonist ventures to France for several years of his life was relocated to China.173 
Likewise, the third installment in the Mummy franchise, starring Brendan Frasier, 
followed a similar path; China replaced the Egyptian setting familiar to fans of the 
series.174 
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Co-production agreements often arrange that technology and filmmaking train-
ing be shared between American and Chinese film producers.175 For the upcoming 
sequels to Avatar, James Cameron’s production company entered agreements with 
Chinese film studios to develop innovative 3D technology in China.176 Likewise, 
the U.S. based DreamWorks opened Oriental DreamWorks, an entirely new anima-
tion studio in Shanghai, to facilitate more co-productions.177 To create Kung Fu 
Panda 3, one of the highest-grossing co-productions,178 DreamWorks shared ad-
vanced animation programs and acting techniques with its Chinese studio.179 
Beijing expects these artistic and technological transfers will foster advances 
in its domestic film industry,180 and eventually displace American movie studios 
altogether.181 Beijing’s strategy has been effective in some cases. The animated 
film, Monster Hunt, one of the biggest hits in Chinese box office history, was cre-
ated entirely by Chinese filmmakers,182 and directed by an alumni of Oriental 
DreamWorks, who began his career working on the Shrek series.183 Through the 
use of co-production agreements, and other restrictions, Beijing appears to be suc-
ceeding at encouraging American studios to divulge filmmaking expertise to do-
mestic producers.184 This is consistent with Chinese Communist Party directives to 
develop the country’s “cultural productive forces” and pursue the “socialist path of 
promoting cultural advance with Chinese characterizes.”185 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A.  Withhold American Film Imports from China 
Hollywood has moved to counter unfavorable trade policies of foreign nations 
in the past by withholding American film imports altogether.186 This has curtailed 
the revenues of foreign film exhibitors, prompting the owners of theater chains to 
lobby the foreign government to revise trade policy.187 Currently, Chinese theaters 
rely on Hollywood imports to generate greater profits than on grosses made from 
exhibiting Chinese films alone.188 By removing American imports from the Chinese 
market, revenue losses from film exhibitors in China could prompt Beijing to re-
consider trade and expression restrictions on American imports. 
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In 2011, the six largest American studios pursued this exact course of action in 
Indonesia,189 the world’s fourth most populous country.190 In February 2011, the 
Indonesian government raised import duties on films by 100%,191 hoping to spur 
local film development.192 Hollywood studios including Walt Disney, Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Paramount 
Pictures, and Universal Pictures responded by boycotting the entire Indonesian mar-
ket — a nation of 237 million.193 Film fans took to social media to complain about 
the lack of options.194 “They’re taking away our right to watch high-quality films,” 
one Indonesian woman complained.195 Consumer spending on theatrical films, typ-
ically reaching $6.2 million a month in Indonesia,196 plummeted 60-70% in four 
months after the Hollywood boycott.197 Meanwhile, the black market for pirated 
Hollywood releases grew,198 with an estimated 50% increase in pirated DVD 
sales.199 
Afraid of missing the final installment of the Harry Potter series, many Indo-
nesians resorted to flying to the nearby nation of Singapore to watch the film.200 
The influx of Indonesian film tourists in the neighboring country was so great, one 
Singaporean theater chain began offering Indonesian viewers a free film screening 
for every purchase of eight other film tickets.201 Faced with declining revenues, In-
donesian theater owners began pressuring its government to revisit the tariff on film 
imports.202 Finally, the government relented and agreed to revise the tax.203 After a 
five-month standoff, the Indonesian government announced Harry Potter and the 
Deathly Hallows - Part 2 would be released domestically before the end of that 
summer.204 
Boycotting the Indonesian import duty proved successful for Hollywood stu-
dios,205 but a similar withdrawal from the Chinese market would face notably dif-
ferent challenges. Chinese theater owners depend on American imports for signifi-
cant amounts of revenue just as Indonesian theaters do.206 However, unlike the still-
developing Indonesian film industry,207 Chinese film production is thriving.208 A 
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withdrawal of American imports would likely reduce the profits of Chinese film 
exhibitors, but the fall may not be steep enough to spur diplomatic action. 
Further, unlike the Indonesian government, Beijing has already shown it will 
renounce popular cultural imports for geopolitical purposes.209 In July 2016, to pro-
test South Korea’s adoption of the American THAAD missile defense system, Bei-
jing initiated a cultural embargo on South Korean entertainment, including televi-
sion programs, music, and films.210 China still maintains this prohibition despite 
previously importing more South Korean-produced television and music than any 
other nation in the world.211 Regardless of the appeal of South Korean media within 
China, over 80% of Chinese citizens support the embargo, according to polls con-
ducted by state-owned news agencies.212 Commenting on the polls, one media outlet 
stated, “[i]t reflects Chinese placing love for their home country before popularity 
of entertainment stars.”213 Although these results are subject to direct government 
censorship, the reports still demonstrate Beijing prioritizes geopolitical objectives 
over increased entertainment revenue. A Hollywood withdrawal from China may 
provoke a comparably strong response from the Chinese government, leaving Hol-
lywood with fewer market opportunities in the country than it currently holds. 
B.  Disrupt the Chinese Film Industry in the International Market 
To counter restrictions on American imports into foreign markets, the U.S. gov-
ernment has previously established retaliatory regulations on foreign films released 
in the U.S. Theoretically, counter regulations should prompt the foreign nation to 
ease its protectionist measures in exchange for the U.S. lawmakers responding in 
kind. However, this strategy has not always proved successful. In 1958, the U.S. 
agreed to exchange ten American films for seven films from the Soviet Union.214 
By 1969, the number of American films purchased by the Soviet Union had only 
reached forty-four.215 The modern U.S.-Chinese relationship is, of course, the polar 
extreme of Cold War diplomacy. The U.S. and China are each other’s largest trad-
ing partners, and are both sensitive to economic disruptions. Nevertheless, this fi-
nancial interdependence does not ensure China will yield to U.S. pressure from re-
taliatory quotas. Chinese studios are not dependent on the North American market, 
with Chinese films rarely finding large success in the United States.216 Retaliatory 
quotas may cost Chinese studios little revenue, leaving government officials unin-
fluenced by the restrictions. 
Despite the lackluster reception of Chinese films by American audiences, Bei-
jing continues to promote expanding Chinese culture into other nations.217 Beijing’s 
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Belt and Road Film Culture Exchange Cooperation links fifteen countries through-
out Asia and Europe.218 Additionally, China has announced a film treaty with Japan 
encouraging co-productions and an exchange of at least ten films a year.219 How-
ever, future international ambitions could be threatened by preemptive Hollywood 
exclusion. In the past, Hollywood studios have negotiated with theater chains in 
other countries to limit competition from foreign films.220 Similar action could be 
implemented again. 
American domination of the international film market was part chance and part 
strategy. From the technological development of film in the 1890s, until the start of 
World War I, movie screenings in most countries were not overwhelmingly domi-
nated by films from a single nation.221 While French films generally led worldwide 
screenings, fierce competition was the norm.222 Market shares varied, with theaters 
in countries like Germany importing 31% of releases from the U.S. in 1913, 27% 
from Italy, 10% from Britain, and producing 12% domestically.223 
Hollywood initially sidelined efforts to establish an overseas distribution net-
work in order to focus on meeting the demand of the growing U.S. domestic mar-
ket.224 Germany, along with Britain, were the only foreign markets where American 
imports held the largest market share.225 Most European film industries either 
slowed or halted after World War I while American film production increased to 
match demand.226 In a process known as “block booking,”227 Hollywood distribu-
tors ended any threat of future foreign competition in European theaters by negoti-
ating exclusive contracts with film exhibitors.228 By only offering theaters the op-
tion to book large volumes of preselected titles, Hollywood distribution contracts 
could sometimes fill foreign theater release schedules two years in advance, leaving 
no time for the theater to screen movies outside the preregistered block of films.229 
Movies from other distributors, including those producing films outside the U.S., 
could not be shown for long stretches of time — making it difficult to compete with 
American imports.230 
Before World War I, in markets like Britain, theater owners could choose from 
individual films offered by distributors.231 Hollywood’s block booking retired this 
process. During the four years preceding the war, 50-60% of British releases were 
American imports.232 By 1919, an estimated 90% of movies shown in Britain were 
American, while less than 1% were British.233 Further, in France, 80% of the French 
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market had been composed of French films before 1914, but by 1917, the share was 
cut to 30.4%.234 
As the film industries of the allied nations were locked out of their own markets 
by Hollywood distributors,235 the U.S. government acted just as aggressively 
against films from the central powers.236 After the U.S. entered World War I, Con-
gress formed the U.S. Division of Films to promote American culture in Europe.237 
President Woodrow Wilson commented on the mission of the U.S. Division of 
Films, stating, “[F]ilm has to rank as the very highest medium for the dissemination 
of public intelligence, and since it speaks a universal language, it lends itself im-
portantly to the presentation of America’s plans and purposes.”238 Selling American 
imports to theaters in neutral Scandinavian markets, the U.S. Division of Films re-
duced the market share of German films in the region from roughly 50% to approx-
imately 3% after 1918.239 
Through World War I, U.S. diplomatic efforts and private Hollywood negoti-
ating ultimately removed the bulk of foreign competitors in the international film 
market. A similar process could be employed against Beijing’s film export ambi-
tions. If Hollywood could aggressively negotiate for privileged partnerships with 
exhibitors in countries Beijing is targeting for expansion, American film producers 
could use their position to restrict Chinese releases in those countries. For the re-
strictions to be effective leverage, however, domestically produced Chinese films 
would have to become lucrative exports for Beijing. Grosses for Chinese exports 
are currently low,240 and American releases still dominate in most markets.241 A 
strategy of excluding Chinese films from other markets would change little for ei-
ther Hollywood or Beijing. 
Although Chinese film exports abroad have not shown competitive potential, 
Chinese investors have acquired significant entertainment assets in other countries, 
including the United States. Chinese investments in Hollywood films have become 
profitable and common.242 Additionally, Chinese companies have purchased con-
trolling stakes in Hollywood studios and U.S.-based exhibitors, such as AMC the-
aters.243 While curtailing Chinese releases in other markets may not be a viable 
strategy for Hollywood studios, U.S. lawmakers could limit the amount of invest-
ment into American studios and theater chains.244 In 2016, 16 Congressmen urged 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to contain the expansion 
of China’s “soft power” and increase scrutiny over foreign acquisitions of American 
media organizations.245 Beijing has already implemented ceilings on foreign capital 
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invested in Chinese films.246 Equivalent regulations in the U.S. would be a propor-
tionate counter-measure. 
C.  An Inclusive Solution 
The strategies discussed thus far have emphasized an adversarial, zero-sum 
game. If Hollywood and Beijing negotiated a compromise, one party would still 
lose some of its objectives. A creative, problem-solving approach may be more per-
suasive for Chinese policymakers. Inclusive solutions emphasize collaboration and 
building relationships through serving the interests of both parties.247 Beijing has a 
long-term interest in advancing its filmmaking capabilities through co-productions 
with Hollywood studios. In exchange for reducing restrictions on American im-
ports, Hollywood studios could offer to increase investment in Chinese co-produc-
tions. 
Raising the number of co-productions would provide Chinese producers 
greater exposure to Hollywood production methods. Moreover, further co-produc-
tions could grant Hollywood studios an opportunity to profit from films tailored 
toward the Chinese market, such as the small-budget blockbuster Wolf Warriors 
II.248 These films are much lower risk than co-productions designed to appeal to 
both North American and Chinese markets, such as Transformers: The Last Knight, 
which, budgeted at $217 million,249 grossed under $229 million in China.250 A 
pledged deal to increase co-productions could motivate Beijing to loosen re-
strictions on imports and lead to higher interconnection between American and Chi-
nese markets overall. Even if successful, this strategy is still only a short-term so-
lution. Greater reliance on China’s box office could backfire if domestic Chinese 
films ever reach comparable quality with American imports and co-productions.251 
Ultimately, Hollywood must learn to entertain American audiences again. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As American moviegoers vanish, screening films in Chinese theaters is becom-
ing more important for Hollywood studios. Enforcing the compliance of Beijing’s 
trade policy with WTO standards for cultural goods seems unlikely. However, Hol-
lywood and U.S. officials still have options to negotiate for fewer restrictions on 
American film imports. This article recommends Hollywood should neither boycott 
the Chinese market, nor move to exclude Chinese film exports from other markets. 
Instead, pledging to increase co-productions with Chinese companies, while limit-
ing Chinese investment in American films and theater chains, may be more suc-
cessful in bringing Beijing to the bargaining table. 
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